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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a nine-year-old child has had two loving mothers for his or
her whole life. The child’s mothers, who were never married, split up but
agreed to share custody. A few years later, the child’s biological mother
suddenly forbids the child from seeing the other mother to whom the child
is not biologically related. Now, imagine that this is happening without
any allegations of wrongdoing and with court approval.
Louisiana courts must decide custody disputes like this one, in which
someone not biologically or legally related to the child parents the child,
specifically in cases between unmarried, same-sex partners. Although the
child and the parent have no legal relationship, they develop a
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psychological attachment. 1 The attachment between a parent and a child
ties them together through each positive interaction and strengthens their
emotional connection. 2 Children with healthy attachments are more likely
to receive support that is valuable to their growth and development, take
appropriate risks, and learn social skills that help them maintain
relationships. 3 When the relationship between the child and the third-party
parent 4 is severed because of the legal parent’s 5 actions, the third-party
parent may be left without redress in the courts, and the child will be left
to deal with the trauma cutting the attachment causes. Effects of separation
from a parental figure include depression, developmental regression,
permanent architectural changes in the brain including lower IQs, and
many others. 6
Louisiana courts, however, do not consider such effects on children in
custody disputes between unmarried, same-sex couples, as the recent
Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Cook v. Sullivan demonstrates. 7 In
Cook, Billie Cook and Sharon Sullivan decided to have a child, parented
the child together for years, and when the couple split up, established a
1. Michelle R. Gros, Since You Brought It Up: Is Legally Separating a Child
From a Nonbiological Third Party Who has Essentially Become the Child’s
Psychological Parent Really In The Best Interest of the Child?, 44 S.U. L. REV.
367, 368 (2017) [hereinafter Gros, Since You Brought It Up].
2. Steve Dennis, The Emotional Ties Between Parents and Children, BYU
IDAHO (Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.byui.edu/home-family/emotional-ties-betweenparents-and-children [https://perma.cc/Y32L-RUYA].
3. Emotional Connection, COLUM. NURTURE SCI. PROGRAM, https://nurture
scienceprogram.org/emotional-connection/ [https://perma.cc/2MPT-UFLU] (last
visited Jan. 17, 2022).
4. A third-party parent is not filiated to a child with whom a filiated parent
intends to coparent. This may include same-sex and different-sex partners,
grandparents, or other family members. See generally Gros, Since You Brought It
Up, supra note 1.
5. A legal parent is one who is legally recognized as a child’s parent and has
the right to custody of the child and make decisions about the child’s health,
education, and well-being. Legal Recognition of LGBT Families, NTL.
CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. 1, 1 (2019), https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/upload
s/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3C9-4U
AY].
6. Trauma Caused by Separation of Children from Parents: A Tool to Help
Lawyers, ABA: SECTION OF LITIG. 1, 4 (2020), https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committees/childrights/child-separa
tion-memo/parent-child-separation-trauma-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAU6-Y
NNT].
7. See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152 (La. 2021).
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custody arrangement where Billie had visitation with the child every other
weekend. 8 When Sharon severed Billie’s visitation with the child, Billie
filed a petition for custody, and the 26th Judicial District Court, using a
list of factors, found Billie to be a legal parent and entitled to custody of
the child. 9 On appeal, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal,
however, found that because Billie was not naturally or legally filiated 10
to the child, she was a stranger to the child in the eyes of the court. 11
Therefore, Billie was required to prove that substantial harm would result
if the court awarded sole custody to Sharon. 12 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeal found that the child was intelligent, outgoing, and happy, and,
therefore, no substantial harm would result from severing the relationship
between Billie and the child. 13 Consequently, the court awarded sole
custody to Sharon. 14 The Cook case demonstrates that the substantial harm
test, as currently written, leaves individuals in unmarried, same-sex
relationships who are not biologically related to a child at a disadvantage.
Parents in this situation face significant hurdles in obtaining custody of a
child they have parented since the very beginning or for a substantial
portion of the child’s life, especially because the substantial harm test fails
to consider the emotional effects on children as a result of severing these
attachments.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court held that
same-sex couples cannot be deprived of the fundamental right to marry
and the “constellation of benefits” that come with that right. 15 However,
Louisiana legislation concerning unmarried, same-sex couples’ parental
rights post-Obergefell remains unchanged. 16 The structure of family units
has evolved in society, and because of this, a revision of the Louisiana
Civil Code articles relating to marriage and parentage is greatly needed to
effectively provide for the best interests of children. 17

8. Id. at 154.
9. Id. at 154–55.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.
11. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 156.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 160.
14. Id.
15. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646, 681 (2015). These rights may
include presumptions of parentage, the rights and duties of marriage, tax benefits,
and more. Id. at 670.
16. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 133, 184–85 (2022).
17. Monica Hof Wallace, A Primer on Child Custody in Louisiana, 65 LOY.
L. REV. 1, 111 (2019).
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The Louisiana legislature has yet to adopt any specific custody
provisions regarding individuals who are in unmarried, same-sex
relationships and have children. Specifically, there is a gap in the law for
same-sex couples where one partner is a biological parent of the child and
the other partner is not biologically related to the child, yet both share
parental responsibilities. 18 Under the current law, the non-biological
parent must meet a two-pronged test from Louisiana Civil Code article 133
for a court to award him or her custody. 19 First, the court must determine
that awarding custody solely to the legal parent will cause substantial harm
to the child. 20 The court will only examine what is in the best interest of
the child, the second prong of the test illustrated in article 133, if the
substantial harm test is met first.21
This analysis is flawed in two ways. First, the non-biological parent
who shared parental responsibilities with the biological parent from the
child’s birth or for a majority of the child’s life is deprived of fundamental
parental rights because of the legislature’s antiquated view of a family
unit. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognize the fundamental rights of parents. 22 Therefore, even
though a non-biological parent maintains the same emotional and
psychological connection to the child, a parent who cannot meet his or her
burden of proving substantial harm will automatically be deprived of his
or her fundamental right as a legal parent because of the lack of a genetic
connection to the child. 23 Second, the best interest of the child is not
considered in cases between non-biological parents and biological parents
until the non-biological parent meets the first prong. 24 This determination
may take months, or even years, 25 and courts may not consider the best
interest of the child in these cases for years—or ever, if they find that no
substantial harm to the child exists.26 Additionally, article 133 gives
Louisiana courts vast discretion in determining what constitutes

18. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 378.
19. Id.; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
20. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 131, 133 (2022).
21. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131, 133 (2022).
22. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; see also State ex rel. G.J.L. and M.M.L., 791
So. 2d 80, 85 (La. 2001).
23. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; see also G.J.L. and M.M.L., 791 So. 2d at 85.
24. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 cmt. a (1993); see also Ferrand v. Ferrand,
287 So. 3d 150, 158 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2019).
25. See Ferrand, 287 So. 3d at 153; see also discussion infra Part II.D.3.
26. See Ferrand, 287 So. 3d at 158–59.
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substantial harm, 27 and, thus, custody disputes often become dependent
upon the judge’s opinion as to whether the circumstances of a given case
present substantial harm. 28 This leads to an inconsistent application of the
article between circuits and confusion concerning the parental rights of
LGBTQ individuals, as demonstrated by comparing the application of
substantial harm in the Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal.29
This Comment argues that the Louisiana legislature should revise
Louisiana Civil Code article 133 to include a factor test similar to the one
the 26th Judicial District set forth in Cook v. Sullivan. 30 By utilizing a
factor test to consider whether substantial harm would result from an
award of sole custody to a legal parent, Louisiana courts would have an
effective means of providing for the best interest of children in custody
disputes. Alternatively, if the Louisiana legislature does not adopt a factor
test, it can amend article 133 to mandate the standard the Louisiana
Supreme Court used in Tracie F. v. Francisco D., which addressed a
situation in which a legal parent consents to joint custody with a nonparent. 31 The standard from Tracie F. requires that when a legal parent
consents to joint custody with a non-legal parent under article 133 but later
wishes to alter that agreement, the legal parent must demonstrate: “(1)
there has been a material change in circumstances after the original
custody award; and (2) the proposed modification is in the best interest of
the child.” 32 Louisiana courts have already used this standard in disputes
between legal parents and non-legal parents who have stipulated

27. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 cmt. a (1993).
28. See, e.g., Ferrand, 287 So. 3d 150; Cook v. Sullivan, 307 So. 3d 1121
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2020).
29. See, e.g., Ferrand, 287 So. 3d at 158–59; Cook, 307 So. 3d 1121; In re
C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
30. See Cook, 307 So. 3d at 1127 (discussing the test the trial court applied
to determine whether the non-biological parent should be deemed a legal parent).
31. See Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231 (La. 2016). In Tracie F.,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana articulated the standard for adjudicating a custody
dispute over custody between a legal parent and a grandparent in which the legal
parent had previously stipulated that the grandparent should be designated as the
domicilary parent. The Court noted the difference between a considered decree
and a stipulated judgment. When a legal parent stipulates joint custody with a
non-legal parent, he or she must show that there has been a material change in
circumstances, and the modification is in the best interest of the child. This is
important because the Court held that the burden of proof to modify the judgment
rests on the party seeking the modification, not necessarily the non-legal parent.
Id. at 235.
32. Id.
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judgments, 33 including a dispute between an unmarried, same-sex
couple. 34 Since courts also used this standard in cases that do not involve
same-sex couples, the legislature could revise the current substantial harm
test without creating a provision that is specifically tailored for same-sex
parents, which it has been unwilling to do. 35
Part I of this Comment examines how the United States Supreme
Court’s decisions in Obergefell v. Hodges and Pavan v. Smith affect the
traditional confines of the family unit. Part I also discusses the paramount
right of a legal parent, as enumerated in Troxel v. Granville. Part II
provides the background and history of Louisiana’s laws concerning
parentage rights for both different-sex and same-sex couples. Specifically,
this part discusses judicial interpretations of custodial disputes between
same-sex partners in Louisiana, both pre-Obergefell and post-Obergefell.
Additionally, Part II looks at Louisiana Civil Code article 133’s substantial
harm test and its inconsistent application to custody disputes between
same-sex couples as illustrated by Louisiana courts’ decisions in In re
C.A.C., Ferrand v. Ferrand, and Cook v. Sullivan. Part III examines the
rights of unmarried, same-sex couples in other states as well as the absence
of the in loco parentis, de facto, and psychological parent status doctrines
in Louisiana. Part IV argues that article 133’s substantial harm test is an
inequitable solution in custody disputes between legal parents and nonlegal parents in unmarried, same-sex relationships and does not consider
the best interests of children. Additionally, Part IV proposes that the
Louisiana legislature redraft article 133 to adopt a factor test similar to one
the trial court used in Cook v. Sullivan. Courts would apply this test to
cases in which there is a non-parent who would be considered a
“psychological parent” but for the legislature’s and courts’ refusals to
adopt the doctrines. Alternatively, the legislature can revise article 133 to
adopt the standard the court in Tracie F. v. Francisco D. used. 36

33. A stipulation is an agreement between two parties that is submitted to the
judge for approval. See Visitation Schedule, US LEGAL, https://www.uslegal
forms.com/forms/la-5298/stipulated-judgment-of-custody-visitation#:~:text=A
%20stipulation%20is%20an%20agreement,signatures%2C%20and%20the%20j
udge’s%20signature [https://perma.cc/A6PF-NBXC] (last visited Jan. 19, 2022)
(select “Description” tab).
34. See In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
35. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also infra note 170 and accompanying
text.
36. See Cook, 307 So. 3d at 154–55; Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 235.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged constitutionally protected,
fundamental privacy rights 37 and extended several decisions in favor of
same-sex rights. 38 The Supreme Court issued favorable decisions once
again for same-sex rights in Obergefell v. Hodges and again, just two years
later, in Pavan v. Smith. 39 Since Obergefell and Pavan, Louisiana courts
must operate in a manner consistent with both these landmark decisions
and with Louisiana law concerning marriage and parenthood, which
remains unchanged in the face of Supreme Court opinions upholding
same-sex marriage. 40
A. Obergefell Alters the Rights of Same-Sex Couples to Marry
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued the
landmark decision of Obergefell v. Hodges. 41 In this case, two men, whose
same-sex partners died before litigation, and 14 other same-sex couples
challenged several states’ statutes that defined marriage as existing only
between a man and a woman. 42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license
37. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (which recognized the
fundamental right to an abortion); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(invalidating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages); Griswold v. Conn., 381
U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (invalidating state law prohibiting use of drugs or devices
of contraception and the counseling, aiding and abetting of the use of
contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the
holding of Griswold to unmarried people).
38. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that a law
preventing anti-discriminatory measures against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals was
unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (holding that
consenting adults have the right to engage in public conduct in the privacy of their
homes); U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (holding that sections of the
Defense of Marriage Act that denied federal recognition of same-sex marriage
were unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of the person protected by the
Fifth Amendment).
39. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.
Ct. 2075 (2017).
40. Laura Tracy, Presumption Junction, What’s That Function: Louisiana
Marriage and Parenthood Laws Post-Obergefell, 81 LA. L. REV. 1523, 1550
(2021).
41. Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644.
42. Id. at 653–56.
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a marriage between two people of the same sex. 43 The Court also
determined whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to
recognize a same-sex marriage license for a marriage performed in a state
that does grant the right. 44
The Court held that denying same-sex couples the right of marriage
denies them “the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to
marriage,” and further held that the “right to marry is a fundamental right
inherent in the liberty of the person . . . under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 45 Thus, states
cannot deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry. 46 As part of its
rationale, the majority opined that states depriving same-sex couples the
right to marry causes children of these families to grow up knowing that
the country considers their families lesser than conventional families. 47
Obergefell sought to protect both romantic bonds and parent-child
relationships, and as such, scholars have sought to understand Obergefell’s
implications for parenting by same-sex couples. 48
B. Parental Implications for Same-Sex, Married Couples Post-Obergefell
While Obergefell held that marriage between same-sex individuals
was a fundamental right, the Court failed to make clear the implications of
legal marriage between these individuals as it relates to parentage. 49 Just
two years after the Obergefell decision, the Supreme Court took up the
same-sex parentage question. 50 In Pavan v. Smith, two married, lesbian
couples brought an action against the Arkansas Department of Health. 51
Each couple gave birth to a child in Arkansas in 2015, and when the
couples applied for birth certificates, each listed their same-sex spouses as
43. Id. at 644.
44. Id. at 656.
45. Id. at 675.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 668.
48. See Douglas Nejaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260,
2265 (2017). See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime, Marriage and the New Parenthood, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1261–63 (2016); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Marriage as
Blindspot: What Children with LGBT Parents Need Now, in AFTER MARRIAGE
EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 127, 150 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016)
(discussing California’s and Maine’s revisions of their parentage codes to ensure
equality for lesbian and gay parents and their children).
49. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1547.
50. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
51. Id. at 2077.
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parents of the children. 52 The Department of Health removed the nonbiological spouses’ names from the children’s birth certificates and listed
only the birth mothers’ names. 53 The Arkansas statute at issue in the case
required the name of the mother’s male spouse to appear on the birth
certificate when a mother conceived a child through artificial reproductive
technologies. 54 The statute contemplated a mother’s husband being put on
the birth certificate. 55 However, here, the two mothers did not have a
husband but a wife. 56 Therefore, the Court’s task was determining whether
the Arkansas statute could apply under the facts. 57
The Arkansas Supreme Court found the statute constitutional because
the statute did not focus on the marital relationship of a husband and wife
but instead focused on the child’s relationship with the biological mother
and biological father. 58 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision and held that birth certificates are
more than a “mere marker of biological relationships” and give married
parents a “form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried
parents.” 59 Therefore, the Arkansas statute was contrary to the holding in
Obergefell since it denied same-sex couples the same “constellation of
benefits” of marriage as different-sex couples by failing to put the name
of a female spouse on the birth certificates. 60 Pavan illustrates that
Obergefell applies not only to the right to marry but also to the rights that
the law traditionally associates with marriage including parental rights.61
C. Troxel v. Granville Recognizes a Legal Parent’s Fundamental Right
Although the Obergefell and Pavan opinions enumerated
fundamental privacy rights for married, same-sex families, the
fundamental rights of legal parents set forth in Troxel v. Granville have
made it difficult to award custody to non-legal parents in custody disputes

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401 (2017).
55. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401 (2017).
56. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077.
57. Id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401 (2017).
58. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 177
(Ark. 2016)).
59. Id. at 2078–79.
60. Id. at 2078.
61. See generally id. at 2075.
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between unmarried, same-sex parents. 62 Parents traditionally enjoy the
right to nurture and rear their children, and the basis of this tradition comes
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 63 The Due
Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 64 Due Process protects
against governmental interference into certain “fundamental rights and
liberty interests,” and a legal parent’s right to custody and make decisions
concerning their children is considered such a fundamental right. 65
In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court determined
whether grandparents should be awarded visitation rights under a
Washington statute. 66 The Troxels, the paternal grandparents in the case,
requested visitation two weekends per month after their son, the children’s
father, committed suicide and the children’s mother opposed overnight
visitation. 67 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, noted that the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests. 68 Justice O’Connor went on to write, “[T]he interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children [] is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 69 The
Washington statute provided that “[a]ny person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings.” 70 The statute further provided that “[t]he court may order
visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest
of the child 71 whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances.” 72 Justice O’Connor noted that this was “breathtakingly
broad” and would potentially allow for a trial court to substitute its
62. See generally id.; Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. See id.; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57 (citing Wash. V. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997) (citation omitted)).
66. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
67. Id. at 61. The children’s mother did not completely oppose visitation with
the Troxels but asked the court to limit visitation to one day per month with no
overnight visits. Id.
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. at 63.
70. Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)).
71. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
72. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)
(1994)).
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determination of the child’s best interests for the parents. 73 Therefore, in
cases involving a legal parent and a non-legal parent or parental figure, the
court must balance both the best interest of the child and a legal parent’s
paramount right. 74
The Troxel plurality decision provides little guidance to legislatures
and courts in constructing or interpreting non-parental visitation and
custody statutes. 75 This is particularly problematic in cases that involve
“third-party” parents. 76 Justice Kennedy, in dissent, expressed concern
that the best interest of the child standard should not be minimalized even
when a legal parent’s liberty interest is at stake. 77 He stated that a fit
parent’s rights versus a stranger’s are much different than a fit parent’s
rights versus a de facto 78 parent’s, and where a third-party acts as a de
facto parent, a court may need to employ the best interest of the child
standard. 79 Justice Kennedy also noted that the plurality’s decision was
based on a faulty presumption about the composition of American families
and did not properly anticipate claims that might arise. 80 Also in dissent,
Justice Stevens opined that a parent’s liberty interest is not an “isolated
right” and must be viewed within the greater context of a child’s
relationships. 81 Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens noted that disputes
between parents and third parties require a different approach when the
child has an interest in maintaining a relationship with the third party. 82
D. Louisiana Also Recognizes a Legal Parent’s Fundamental Right
The Louisiana Supreme Court also recognizes a parent’s rights to the
custody, care, and control of his or her child: “[P]arents have a natural,
fundamental liberty interest in the continuing companionship, care,
custody, and management of their children . . . .” 83 In State ex rel. Paul v.
Peniston, Justice Tate, in a concurring opinion, noted that the rights of
parents to their children “existed before governments or other social
73. Id. at 67.
74. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 373.
75. Visitation is a term of art that refers to when a parent or non-parent does
not have custody. Wallace, supra note 17, at 116–17; see infra note 98.
76. See generally id.
77. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. See discussion infra Part III.C.
79. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. State ex rel. G.J.L. and M.M.L., 791 So. 2d 80, 85 (La. 2001).
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institutions of mankind.” 84 He noted that this right is a God-given right,
and the state does not have the power to take away such a right in favor of
a stranger. 85
Louisiana’s laws reflect the paramount right of parents in the care
custody, and control of their children. The Louisiana Children’s Code
adopts the idea of a parent’s fundamental right in its preamble: “that
parents have the paramount right to raise their children . . . .” 86 Courts must
honor parental choice of custody unless that choice goes against the best
interest of the child. 87 This is evidenced in the Civil Code’s custody
hierarchy. 88 Before 1993, 89 joint custody to parents was presumed, and this
arrangement was naturally assumed to be in the best interest of the child. 90
Courts often considered the quality of the relationship between the parents
and their willingness to support a relationship between the child and other
parent. 91 After 1993, however, as a result of the focus in custody disputes
shifting solely to the best interest of the child, the preference for parental
agreement replaced the presumption of joint custody. 92 If parents cannot
come to an agreement or the agreement is not in the best interest of the
child, a court must award custody to the parents jointly. 93 However, if one
of the parents can prove that custody by that parent alone would be in the
best interest of the child, the court must award sole custody. 94 If the parents
cannot come to an agreement and neither joint nor sole custody in the
parents is in the best interest of the child, a court may grant custody to a

84. State ex rel. Paul v. Peniston, 105 So. 2d 228, 232 (La. 1958) (Tate, J.,
concurring).
85. Id.
86. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 101 (2022).
87. LA. CIV. CODE art. 132 (2022).
88. See id. arts. 131–33. First in the hierarchy is a preference for parental
agreement. If the parents cannot reach an agreement, or if the agreement is not in
the best interest of the child, then the parents must be awarded joint custody. Id.
art. 132. Next, if one parent provides clear and convincing evidence that custody
in that parent alone would serve the best interest of the child, then that parent must
be awarded sole custody. Id. Lastly, if a non-parent proves that substantial harm
would result to the child, the non-parent will be awarded custody. Id. art. 133.
89. See discussion infra Part II.D.
90. Wallace, supra note 17, at 50.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (2019)); Evans v. Lungrin, 708
So. 2d 731, 735–36 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999)).
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Harrell v. Harrell, 236 So. 3d 704, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2017).
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non-parent. 95 However, this is only when the non-parent can prove that
parental custody would pose substantial harm to the child. 96 A court must
consider each of these steps against a parent’s protected interest in the care,
custody, and control of his or her children. 97
Although Louisiana’s custody laws seek to protect a parent’s
fundamental rights, Louisiana’s visitation 98 laws have been subject to
constitutional debate. 99 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:344 permits
grandparents to receive visitation with their grandchild if their child is
deceased, interdicted, or incarcerated if it is found first that the visitation
serves the best interest of the child. 100 In 2012, the legislature amended
Louisiana Civil Code article 136 to permit grandparents to seek reasonable
visitation with their grandchild if it was in the child’s best interest. 101 In
2018, the legislature again amended article 136 to allow grandparents to
seek reasonable visitation with their grandchildren only if doing so was in
the child’s best interest and if the child’s parents were living apart in
addition to being either divorced or unmarried. 102 Both Revised Statutes §
9:344 and Civil Code article 136 require extraordinary circumstances, and
the class of persons listed in each is narrower than the Washington statute

95. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
96. Id.; see also McCormic v. Rider, 27 So. 3d 277, 279 (La. 2010); In re
C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58, 67 (La. 2017).
97. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Wallace, supra
note 17, at 51.
98. Visitation is a term of art that is used to describe circumstances when a
parent or non-parent does not have custody. Specifically, visitation is the time
spent with a child outside of custody. Although visitation and custody are
fundamentally different, comparing Louisiana’s visitation statues with article 133
demonstrates the disparity in the Louisiana legislature’s willingness to extend
rights to grandparents versus third parties who have acted as parents to a child. As
visitation time with a non-parent increases, the potential for infringement on a
parent’s right enumerated in Troxel also increases. However, after the 2018
revision of Louisiana Civil Code article 136, some grandparents do not have to
show extraordinary circumstances to obtain visitation rights, while under article
133, a third party who has acted as a parent to a child still must meet the substantial
harm standard. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 133, 136 (2022); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
99. See e.g., Galjour v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001);
Garner v. Thomas, 13 So. 3d 784, 792 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2009).
100. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:344 (2022); Galjour, 795 So. 2d at 358.
101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 136 (2012).
102. LA. CIV. CODE art. 136 (2018).
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in Troxel that provided any person could seek custody of a child. 103
Therefore, while these articles are constitutional on their face under
Troxel, the issue of whether their application violates the protected
interests of parents is up for debate. 104
II. ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE IN LOUISIANA
In the wake of Obergefell and Pavan, states are struggling with how
to apply traditional, biological laws that establish the legal relationship
between parents and their children to same-sex families. 105 The Louisiana
legislature’s unwillingness to extend rights in marriage and parenthood to
same-sex couples through state legislation has caused Louisiana courts to
face similar struggles in establishing parental rights after Obergefell and
Pavan. 106 Louisiana courts must address not only parental rights for
married, same-sex couples but also for unmarried, same-sex couples—an
issue that the United States Supreme Court did not expressly decide in
Obergefell, Pavan, or Troxel. 107
A. Filiation Provides a Presumption of Parentage
The Preamble of the Louisiana Children’s Code states that family is
recognized as the most “fundamental unit of human society” and the
relationship between a parent and child is “preeminent in establishing and
maintaining the well-being of the child . . . .” 108 In Louisiana, the legal
relationship between a parent and a child is called filiation. 109 Filiation is
the juridical link that unites a child to their mother or father and establishes
who has parental rights and obligations. 110 By establishing filiation, a
103. LA. CIV. CODE art. 136 (2022); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:344 (2022); see also
Galjour, 795 So. 2d at 358; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
26.10.160(3) (1994)).
104. Wallace, supra note 17, at 53.
105. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1528.
106. Id.
107. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Pavan v.
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017); Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
108. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 101 (2022).
109. LA. CIV. CODE art. 178 (2022). Filiation is relevant to custody disputes in
that it requires someone who has not established legal filiation to meet the
substantial harm standard to gain custody. Id. art. 133.
110. J.R. Trahan, Glossae on the New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 387,
388 n.1 (2007) (citing Gérard Cornu, DRIOT CIVIL: LA FAMILLE No. 195, at 313
(7th ed. 2001)); see also Katherine Shaw Spaht & William Marshall Shaw, Jr.,
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parent has the ability and duty to care for, supervise, protect, discipline,
and instruct his or her children. 111 Parents owe certain rights and duties to
their children that come along with these obligations. 112
Louisiana Civil Code article 179 enumerates the three ways in which
filiation may be established. 113 Filiation may be established by: (1) proof
of maternity; (2) proof of paternity; or (3) adoption. 114 Article 184 states
that “[m]aternity may be established by a preponderance of the evidence
that the child was born of a particular woman . . . .” 115 Maternal filiation
is generally easy to prove because it flows from the fact of birth.116 In
contrast, paternal filiation lacks the outward manifestation of birth, which
makes it more difficult to prove. 117 The Louisiana Civil Code addresses
this difficulty by providing three presumptions of paternity, found in
articles 185, 186, and 196. 118
Louisiana Civil Code article 185 provides a paternal presumption,
which recognizes that the husband in a marriage is the father of a child of
the marriage. 119 Under article 185, a husband is presumed to be the father
The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and
Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59, 65 (1976).
111. LA. CIV. CODE art. 224 (2022).
112. Id. Under this article, parents are obligated to support, maintain, and
educate their children. Id.
113. Id. art. 179.
114. See id.
115. Id. art. 184; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 cmt. a (2019).
116. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1531 nn.72–73.
117. Id.
118. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 185–86, 196 (2022). Civil Code article 185 provides
that “[t]he husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of a child born
during the marriage or within [300] days of the termination of the marriage.” Id.
art. 185. Article 186 provides:
If a child is born within [300] days from the day of the termination of a
marriage and his mother has married again before his birth, the first
husband is presumed to be the father.
If the first husband, or his successor, obtains a judgment of disavowal of
paternity of the child, the second husband is presumed to be the father.
The second husband, or his successor, may disavow paternity if he
institutes a disavowal action within a peremptive period of one year from
the day that the judgment of disavowal obtained by the first husband is
final and definitive.
Id. art. 186. Article 196 provides that a man who acknowledges, by authentic act,
a child not filiated to another man is presumed to be the father of the child. Id. art.
196.
119. Id. art. 185.
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of a child either born to his wife during the marriage or born within 300
days 120 of the termination of the marriage. 121 After Obergefell and Pavan,
Louisiana courts extended the marital presumption under article 185 to
include a mother’s same-sex spouse. 122 This presumption may be rebutted
through a disavowal action 123 under articles 187 and 188. 124
Traditionally, the presumption of paternity served several functions
including: (1) providing a “legal certainty for purposes such as inheritance
and succession;” 125 (2) preserving the marital relationship between the
couple by “protect[ing] the sanctity of the marriages by assuming the
husband and wife [had] both remained true to their marriage vows”; 126 and
(3) “promot[ing] the welfare of the child because it provided the child with
a father . . . .” 127 Since the husband of a mother is typically used to establish
parentage, filiation and marriage are closely related.128
1. Establishing Filiation Outside of Marriage
Although the legal relationship between a parent and a child is
typically related to marriage, the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s
and 1970s began setting forth additional measures of constitutional

120. The full term of a pregnancy is 40 weeks, which amounts to roughly 300
days. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id.; Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019). In
Boquet, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal applied the marital
presumption in article 185 retroactively to the wife of a woman who gave birth to
a child during the marriage. The Third Circuit held that because the child was born
during the marriage, the female spouse of the biological mother was the presumed
parent of the child, and she owed the child support since her time to file a
disavowal action prescribed. See id.
123. Disavowal actions allow for the husband in a different-sex marriage to
challenge paternity of the child by showing that it is impossible for him to be the
biological father of the child in question. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 cmt. b
(2005). Disavowal actions sever the bond of filiation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 187
(2022).
124. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 187–88 (2022).
125. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1532 (quoting Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology,
and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Martial Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV.
246, 248–49 (2006)).
126. Id. (quoting Singer, supra note 125, at 249 n.14).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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protection for non-marital families. 129 In Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute that
regulated “illegitimate children” 130 to a lesser status of “other dependents”
who were not entitled to recover benefits until other more worthy
dependents recovered. 131 The Court held that it is constitutionally
impermissible to deny rights and protections to children born outside of
marriage. 132
While custody often turns on filiation established through marriage,
custody can be awarded based on other actions including paternity actions,
voluntary relinquishments of custody, or petitions in custody disputes
when the parties are unmarried. 133 In Louisiana, a party proves maternal
filiation by evidence “that the child was born of particular woman” and
with a birth certificate, birth to a particular woman is not difficult to
prove. 134 However, it is more difficult for a party to prove paternal
filiation. 135 There are two methods that unmarried, different-sex couples
with a child can take to establish paternity in Louisiana: (1) the fathers can
sign an Acknowledgment of Paternity Affidavit; or (2) a court can
adjudicate on the question of the child’s paternity. 136 A man can, by
authentic act, formally acknowledge a child, and under Civil Code article
196, the Code presumes the paternity of the man and provides him with
the rights of custody and visitation. 137 When a man formally acknowledges
a child by authentic act, although he will be able to present the

129. Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104
CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2016).
130. This term is no longer used and has been replaced with non-marital
children.
131. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 168 (1972)
(“Unacknowledged illegitimate children, however, are relegated to the lesser
status of ‘other dependents’ under § 1232(8) of the workmen’s compensation
statute and may recover only if there are not enough surviving dependents in the
preceding classifications to exhaust the maximum allowable benefits.” (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
132. Id. at 176; see Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right
to Nonmarriage, 97 BOS. U. L. REV. 425, 447 (2017).
133. See S.B. 291, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018) (enacted as Act. No. 412);
Wallace, supra note 17, at 18.
134. LA. CIV. CODE art. 184 (2022).
135. Wallace, supra note 17, at 19.
136. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 196, 198 (2022).
137. Id. art. 196. This article also imposes the obligation of child support on a
man who formally acknowledges a child. Id.
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acknowledgement to obtain custody, visitation, or child support, he will
not have full, filial rights. 138
Some proof of paternity is required to obtain legal custody rights
without marriage. 139 When a man does not sign a formal acknowledgement
of paternity and is not married to the mother of the child, he may file an
avowal action 140 to receive a judgment of paternity. 141 An avowal action
may be instituted at any time except when the child is presumed to be the
child of another man. 142 When this is the case, an avowal action must be
instituted within one year of the child’s birth. 143 If a man files an avowal
action to establish paternity of the child, he may also seek custody in his
petition and will have full, filial rights. 144
A child may also institute an action to prove paternity even if he or
she is presumed to be the child of another man.145 A parent or legal
guardian may bring a child’s filiation action on behalf of a child at any
time provided that the alleged father is still alive. 146 When the alleged
father has died, the action may only be brought within one year from the
date of the alleged father’s death. 147
Through both a child’s filiation action and a man’s avowal action, a
biological father may become filiated to a child even if another man is
presumed to be the father of the child. 148 Thus, when the marital
presumption of paternity under article 185 and the avowal action under
article 198 operate in tandem, there may be two legal fathers of a child. 149
Louisiana is the only state in which a child can have two legallyrecognized fathers. 150 This doctrine is called dual paternity and was

138. Id. Although the presumption in favor of the man is limited, the
presumption in favor of the child is unlimited. Id.
139. Wallace, supra note 17, at 19.
140. When a child is born outside of marriage, an avowal action allows a man
to bring a judicial action to filiate himself to the child. LA. CIV. CODE art. 198
(2022).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. art. 197.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. arts. 185, 197–98.
149. Id. arts. 185, 198.
150. Henry S. Rauschenberger, To Kill a Cuckoo Bird: Louisiana’s Dual
Paternity Problem, 77 LA. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2017).
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adopted not for purposes of same-sex parenting but rather for purposes of
child support and succession. 151
2. Establishing Filiation in a Changing Society
Today, conception does not always occur through sexual
intercourse. 152 Modern technology allows couples or individuals to
conceive through assisted reproduction. 153 Different-sex couples may not
be able to conceive because of functional infertility, which is the inability
to have children for medical reasons.154 For single persons or same-sex
couples, however, structural infertility typically causes the inability to
conceive. 155 Structural infertility requires another party’s biological
assistance in combination with his or her own to reproduce. 156 If an
individual or same-sex couple does not intend to adopt—or is legally
precluded from adoption 157—the couple can use assisted reproductive
technologies, like in vitro fertilization 158 or artificial insemination, 159 to
have a child. While surrogacy160 is available to different-sex couples in
Louisiana, it is not available to same-sex couples because both members
151. See id. at 1183–86.
152. Anne R. Dana, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal
Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 353, 354 (2011).
153. Id.
154. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1534. “[I]nfertility is defined as not being able to
get pregnant (conceive) after one year (or longer) of unprotected sex.”
Reproductive Health: Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility
/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6PEP-4335] (follow “What is infertility?” tab).
155. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1534.
156. Id.
157. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
158. In Vitro Fertilization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20vitro%20fertilization [https://perma.cc/S
2JC-4PTT] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) (In vitro fertilization is defined as
“fertilization by mixing sperm with eggs surgically removed from an ovary
followed by uterine implantation of one or more of the resulting fertilized eggs.”).
159. Artificial Insemination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/artificial%20insemination [https://perma.cc/M
HL2-VRCQ] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) (Artificial insemination is defined as
“introduction of semen into the uterus or oviduct by other than natural means.”).
160. Surrogate Mother, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/surrogate%20mother (last visited Oct. 1, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/M9EE-FSSW] (A surrogate mother is defined as “a woman who
becomes pregnant by artificial insemination or by implantation of a fertilized egg
. . . for the purpose of carrying the fetus to term for another person . . . .”).
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of the couple must provide genetic material to enter into an enforceable
surrogacy agreement. 161
In Louisiana Civil Code article 188, the Louisiana legislature provides
for the establishment of filiation for married, different-sex couples who
use reproductive technologies to conceive.162 Under article 188, a husband
may not disavow a child born to his wife when the child is the result of
assisted conception to which he consented. 163 Article 188 is the only Civil
Code article dealing with the presumption of paternity that does not
“presume[] an act of sexual intercourse between the mother and the man
presumed to be the father.” 164 Article 188 exemplifies that the foundation
of filiation has its roots in biology, which makes the application of filiation
to same-sex couples problematic. 165
Filiation may be by nature, which describes a genetic link between a
parent and child, or by law, which requires an act and judgment of adoption
that “arises from the legislative will to create something identical to this
[natural] filial line so as to attach the adopted child to an individual or to
the spouses that the law institutes as parent(s).” 166 Louisiana Civil Code
article 199 provides non-biological parents the opportunity to establish
filiation through adoption where “the adopting parent becomes the parent
of the child for all purposes . . . .” 167 Currently, Louisiana law provides
that a single person or a married couple jointly may adopt a child. 168
Therefore, Louisiana allows married, same-sex couples to petition to
jointly adopt but does not allow unmarried couples, either same or
different sex, to jointly adopt. 169
B. Rights of Unmarried, Same-Sex Couples in Louisiana
In 2018, Louisiana state senator J.P. Morell introduced Senate Bill 98,
a bill designed to be more inclusive of same-sex couples by including

161. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2720 (2022).
162. LA. CIV. CODE art. 188 (2022).
163. Id.
164. Original Brief on Behalf of Brittany M. Boquet, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-798), 2018
WL 1910871, at *8.
165. LA. CIV CODE art. 188 (2022); Tracy, supra note 40, at 1530.
166. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1529–30 (alteration in original); see also Trahan,
supra note 110, at 388 n.1.
167. LA. CIV. CODE art. 199 (2022).
168. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1221 (2022).
169. Id.
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gender neutral language in Civil Code articles. 170 Gene Mills, head of
conservative, Christian-lobby group Louisiana Family Forum, was the
only person who testified against the bill saying that “[o]ften, Louisiana
offers a different opinion than the U.S. Supreme Court, which has been
reversed in over 200 occasions.” 171 Mills, who opposes same-sex
marriage, argued that the Supreme Court could again decide to make
same-sex marriage illegal in the future. 172 Additionally, he stated that
having two mothers or two fathers is less preferred than having a mother
and a father. 173 Senate Bill 98 failed with only one senator voting in favor
of the legislation. 174
Since Obergefell and Pavan, the Louisiana legislature has not revised
the Louisiana Civil Code articles relating to marriage and parentage.175
Some Civil Code articles can be interpreted as gender neutral, such as
article 86, which defines marriage as a “legal relationship between a man
and a woman.” 176 Therefore, by removing “man and woman” and
replacing it with “two persons,” the meaning of article 86 can still conform
with Obergefell. 177 However, other articles, such as the filiation articles,

170. Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana Senate Committee Rejects Use of LGBTFriendly Language in Marriage Laws, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 26, 2018,
10:16 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_360fecca-3945-525ab918-0ffa8e460080.html [https://perma.cc/95WQ-4K5C].
171. Id.
172. Id. In the 2021 Regular Session, the Louisiana legislature also proposed
a bill to deny gender-affirming medical care to transgender youth. This bill also
included penalties for parents who encourage or facilitate minors’ access to
gender affirming medical care. Kerith J. Conron, Prohibiting Gender-Affirming
Medical Care for Youth, UCLA SCH. OF L.: WILLIAMS INST. (Mar. 2022),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Trans-Youth-HealthBans-Mar-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5NY-KXKY]. Louisiana courts have also
engaged in explicit discriminatory behavior against LGBTQ individuals.
Additionally, in 2018, the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to grant writ to
Governor Jon Bel Edward’s appeal concerning an executive order that would have
prohibited discrimination against people who work for state governments based
on sexual orientation and gender identity. This means that state employees can be
fired for being transgender or being in a same-sex relationship. O’Donoghue,
supra note 170.
173. O’Donoghue, supra note 170.
174. Id.
175. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 86, 89, 185–98 (2022).
176. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1551 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 86 (2020)).
177. Id.
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which are premised on gender-specific language, are difficult for courts to
apply to same-sex couples, especially unmarried, same-sex couples. 178
C. Louisiana Courts Interpret Parental Code Articles Both Before and
After Obergefell & Pavan
Before Obergefell, Louisiana courts looked to marriage as an
important consideration in establishing parental rights and were reluctant
to grant parental rights to both biological and non-biological parents in
same-sex relationships. 179 In Black v. Simms, Kimberlee Black and
Kimberley Simms were in an unmarried, same-sex relationship until
2004. 180 The couple conceived a child through artificial insemination, and
Simms gave birth to the couple’s daughter in January 2000. 181 In 2004, the
relationship ended, and Black filed a petition seeking sole custody or,
alternatively, joint custody and visitation with the child. 182 The trial court
and appellate court both denied Black’s request because the courts applied
the substantial harm standard—the standard necessary for non-parents to
receive custody of children. 183 To gain custody rights of her daughter,
Black needed to show that awarding sole custody to Simms would result
in substantial harm to the child.184 Black claimed that she and the child had
a parent-child relationship, she and Simms decided together to have a
child, and the child would suffer substantial harm if their relationship was
severed. 185 Both courts, however, denied Black’s request for sole or joint
custody because she did not meet her burden of proving substantial
harm. 186
Louisiana courts have also at times refused to issue consent judgments
of custody based on agreements by a legal parent to share custody with
their non-marital, same-sex partner. 187 In In re Melancon, same-sex
partners used artificial insemination to have a child, and the biological

178. Id.
179. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2022); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d
1140 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009).
180. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1141.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1140; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
184. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1140.
185. Id. at 1141.
186. Id. at 1140.
187. See generally In re Melancon, 62 So. 3d 759, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2010).
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mother consented to joint custody with her partner. 188 The trial court,
however, refused to issue a consent judgment of custody and stated that
the non-biological parent must plead that the award of sole custody to the
biological parent would result in substantial harm to the child.189 Although
the court in In re Melancon refused to issue a consent judgment, in In re
J.E.T., decided just one year before In re Melancon, the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal granted a lesbian couple’s joint petition to
establish joint custody. 190 The consent judgment issued in In re J.E.T. in
2005 was later upheld as valid by the Louisiana First Circuit, overturning
In re Melancon. 191
Although the First Circuit in In re Melancon refused to issue a consent
judgment between a legal parent and a non-marital, same-sex partner, the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the right of a legal parent to consent
to custody with a non-parent in Tracie F. v. Francisco D. 192 The court
articulated the standard for adjudicating a custody dispute between a legal
parent and a grandparent in which the legal parent had previously
stipulated that the grandparent should be designated as the domiciliary
parent. 193 The court held that “the overarching inquiry in an action to
change custody is in ‘the best interest of the child.’” 194 Additionally, the
court found that when a legal parent with joint custody seeks modification
of a stipulated custody award, he or she must prove: (1) that there has been
a material change in circumstances after the original custody award; and
(2) the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. 195 The
court found that the legal parent failed to prove that modification to the
longstanding agreement would be in the child’s best interest and affirmed
the appellate court’s decision maintaining the joint custody arrangement
with the grandparent. 196 The court noted the difference between a
considered decree and a stipulated judgment as well as the differing
burdens of proof. 197 When a legal parent stipulates to joint custody with a
188. Id. at 763.
189. Id.
190. In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
191. Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 17, at 76.
192. See Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231, 241 (La. 2016).
193. Id. The domiciliary parent is the parent who has authority to make all
decisions affecting the child and with whom the child primarily resides. LA. REV.
STAT. § 9:335 (2022).
194. Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 235.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 239. A considered decree is one in which an award of permanent
custody is given after the trial court receives evidence of parental fitness to
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non-legal parent, he or she must show that there has been a material change
in circumstances and that the modification is in the best interest of the
child. 198 This requirement is important because the court held that the
burden of proof to modify the judgment rests on the party seeking the
modification rather than on the non-legal parent. 199
The standard articulated in Tracie F. was used by the First Circuit
Court of Appeal in In re J.E.T, a case involving lesbian partners, Jennifer
Thomas and Jacqueline Calandro, who were in a 17-year relationship. 200
After failed attempts at in vitro fertilization, Thomas adopted a sixteenmonth-old child who had been living with the couple since his birth. 201
Ten days after the adoption, Calandro and Thomas jointly filed a motion
to establish joint custody; May 12, 2005, the court granted the two women
joint legal care, custody, and control of the child and designated them as
co-domiciliary parents. 202 The relationship soured in 2015, and Calandro
filed a motion to prevent Thomas from relocating the child to Texas. 203 In
an attempt to seek sole custody, Thomas reconvened, asserting that the
stipulated consent judgment was void ab initio as being against public
policy. 204 Thomas argued that a legal parent could not enter into a custody
agreement with a non-legal parent unless he or she could show the legal
parent’s lack of fitness. 205 Relying on Tracie F., the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal overruled its decision in In re Melancon. 206 The court
found that in Tracie F., the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged a
legal parent’s right to enter into a consent judgment of legal custody with
a non-parent and did not indicate such a judgment would be against public
policy and absolutely null. 207 Thomas also argued that the burden of proof
exercise care, custody, and control of children. A stipulated judgment is a
judgment a court renders when parties consent to custodial arrangements without
considering evidence of parental fitness. Id.
198. Id. at 241 (citing Dalme v. Dalme, 21 So. 3d 477, 479–80 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 2009)).
199. Id. at 235; see also 1 ROBERT C. LOWE, AWARD TO PERSON OTHER THAN
PARENT (SECTION INCLUDES DISCUSSION OF SAME SEX PARENTS), LA. PRAC.
DIVORCE § 7:32 (2021 ed.).
200. See In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 581. Ab initio is defined as “[f]rom the beginning.” Ab initio,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
205. In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d at 581.
206. Id. at 582.
207. Id.
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to change the prior agreement should be on the non-biological parent. 208
The court again relied on Tracie F. and held that the burden of proof to
modify a judgment rests on the party seeking the modification, and, thus,
the burden of proof was on Thomas. 209 Therefore, although a legal parent
has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children,
when he or she consents to shared custody with a non-legal parent, the
burden is on the legal parent to later modify that agreement. 210
D. Louisiana’s Two-Pronged Test for Custody Disputes Between a Legal
Parent and Non-Parent
In custody disputes between a legal parent and non-legal parent in
which there has been no stipulated judgment, Louisiana Civil Code article
133 controls. 211 Before 1982, under Louisiana law, a court could deprive
a legal parent of parental custody only when the “parent [was] unable or
unfit, having forfeited parental rights.” 212 At the time, the Louisiana
Supreme Court noted that a best interest test alone was insufficient to
deprive a parent of his or her paramount right to custody of a child. 213 In
1982, the Louisiana legislature codified a two-part statutory test that
required non-parents to show that parental custody was “detrimental” to a
child and that divesting the legal parent of custody was necessary to serve
the best interest of the child. 214 In 1993, however, the legislature changed
the language of article 133 to require that non-parents prove that sole
custody to a legal parent would result in substantial harm to the child. 215
Therefore, for a court to award a non-parent custody over a legal parent,
the non-parent must prove that (1) custody to the legal parent would cause
substantial harm to the child; and (2) custody to the non-parent is in the
best interest of the child. 216

208. Id. at 583.
209. Id. at 584.
210. See id.
211. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
212. Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675, 677 (La. 1974); see also Wallace, supra
note 17, at 70.
213. Wood, 290 So. 2d at 677.
214. Act No. 307, 1982 La. Acts. 804.
215. Act No. 261, 1993 La. Acts. 610.
216. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131, 133 (2022).

2022]

COMMENT

343

1. Is the Best Interest of the Child Test Really Required?
The analysis of the best interest of a child is required in custody
disputes. 217 Louisiana Civil Code article 131 states, “[T]he court shall
award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the
child.” 218 Therefore, a court should not have discretion in applying the
analysis, and comment (a) of the article states the test is the “overriding
test” in all custody disputes. 219 However, although the best interest of the
child test is mandated, in practice, the best interest of the of the child test
is only applied sometimes. 220 Louisiana Civil Code article 134 enumerates

217. Id. art. 131.
218. Id.
219. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 cmt. a (2022).
220. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 398; see, e.g., Watson v.
Watson, 46 So. 3d 218, 221 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010).
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14 factors 221 to consider in determining the best interest of the child. 222
But, because courts are not bound by a mechanical evaluation of these
factors or their application, Louisiana’s policy adherence to the best
interest of the child is undermined. 223 Article 134 allows the court to
consider relevant factors, and, thus, judges are given vast discretion in
choosing which factors to consider, which decreases a child’s right to a
221. Article 134 requires courts to consider all relevant factors in determining
the best interest of the child, including:
(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children’s
Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and
the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.
(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.
(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the
child.
(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any
party.
(9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an
abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent
shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party,
except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive,
reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable
concerns for the child’s safety or well-being while in the care of the other
party.
(13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134 (2022).
222. Id.
223. See id.; see also Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 398.
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full evidentiary hearing. 224 Courts, however, only use the factors when
there are two parents involved in a custody dispute or only after a court
finds that substantial harm would result to a child by awarding sole
custody to a filiated parent in disputes between a parent and non-parent. 225
If a court finds that no substantial harm will result, it will not consider the
best interest of the child factors because the court will, by default, give the
legal parent custody of the child. 226
2. A Non-Parent’s Burden of Proving Substantial Harm
The new “substantial harm” language in article 133 following the 1993
revision was intended to create an efficient means of giving primacy to a
parent’s paramount right to custody of his child in disputes against a nonparent. 227 Comment (b) to article 133 makes it clear that a non-parent
always bears the burden of proving substantial harm in a custody dispute
with a legal parent. 228 Article 133 states:
If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent
would result in substantial harm to the child, the court shall award
custody to another person with whom the child has been living in
a wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any other
person able to provide an adequate and stable environment. 229
Although the paramount consideration in custody disputes should be
the best interest of the child, in cases involving parents and non-parents,
the factors set out in article 134 are not considered until the court
determines that substantial harm will not result from depriving the legal
parent of sole custody. 230 The court must first turn to article 133, and
because courts may only use article 133 in cases between non-parents and
parents, these custody disputes rest largely on a court’s interpretation of
substantial harm. 231 Substantial harm may include “parental unfitness,
neglect, abuse, abandonment of rights, and is broad enough to include ‘any
224. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 399. See, e.g., Watson,
46 So. 3d at 222; see also Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child
Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 784 (1985) (arguing that social science
provides substantially more effective guidance than raw judicial intuition).
225. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1536; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 133–34 (2022).
226. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
227. Wallace, supra note 17, at 70.
228. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 cmt. b (2019).
229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
230. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 287 So. 3d 150, 154 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2019).
231. LOWE, supra note 199, at 1.
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other circumstances, such as prolonged separation of the child from its
natural parents, that would cause the child to suffer substantial harm,’” 232
but Louisiana courts inconsistently apply the term.
3. Louisiana’s Courts Flip Flop on Their Applications of Article 133
In In re C.A.C., the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
In this matter, we are called upon to interpret custody laws in the
context of a same-sex relationship, and consider issues not
previously before this Court. Our legislature has not yet addressed
what changes to the law are necessary and/or appropriate in
custody proceedings involving same-sex relationships since the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges. 233
In In re C.A.C., a long-term, lesbian couple separated, and the nonbiological mother sought custody of a child the two had raised together
since the child’s birth. 234 The two women lived together in a committed
relationship for 18 years, and at the time of their separation, their daughter
was seven. 235 The biological mother asserted her constitutionally protected
right to limited physical custody of the child with her ex-partner. 236 The
trial court awarded joint custody, designating the biological mother as
domiciliary parent. 237 The biological mother appealed the judgment, and
the court of appeal affirmed. 238
Both the trial and appellate courts’ analyses rested largely on the
substantial harm language of article 133, finding substantial harm to the
child would result from an emotional separation from the non-biological
mother. 239 In considering substantial harm, the court considered the
intention of the parties in raising the child, the emotional connection
between the child and non-parent, and the effect of separation from either
parent. 240 Additionally, there was documentary evidence that the
232. Wallace, supra note 17, at 112 (citing Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909,
920 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016)); see also Ramirez v. Ramirez, 124 So. 3d 8, 17
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2013).
233. In re C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58, 66 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
234. Id. at 62–63.
235. Id. at 61.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 70.
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biological mother wanted or expected her ex-partner to be involved in the
child’s life. 241 The Fourth Circuit noted that article 133 was not designed
to address the situation where a same-sex couple acted as parents to a child
over a long period of time and where the child has a strong attachment to
both adults. 242 The court went on to explain that article 133 presumes the
third party seeking custody is “less likely than the parent to have a parentchild bond.” 243 This presumption, the court stated, presupposes the fitness
of one or both parents and creates a threat of harm to the child.244 The court
also explained how articles 131 through 134 are set up to create the rights
of parents in traditional families. 245
In Ferrand v. Ferrand, a case involving a non-traditional family,
Vincent, a transgender 246 man, and his ex-partner, Paula, a cisgender 247
female, had twins through artificial insemination. 248 When the twins were
born, the couple had been together for seven years, and the two presented
themselves as a married couple, although they were not legally married. 249
The children called Vincent “Daddy,” and he was active in their lives. 250
When the twins were four years old, Paula moved out of the couple’s
home, and Vincent became the primary caregiver to the children for two

241. Id. at 62. This documentary evidence included: (1) a Domestic
Partnership Agreement that the biological mother signed, which contemplated
joint custody in the event that the parties separated; (2) a power of attorney in
which the biological mother granted her partner unlimited rights over the child;
and (3) a testament that left the biological mother’s partner as a trustee of the trust
in favor of their daughter and instructed both extended families to be involved in
the child’s life. Id. at 65.
242. Id. at 68–69.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 69.
245. Id.
246. Transgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/transgender [https://perma .cc/D3BL-F2TK] (last visited
Oct. 10, 2021) (Transgender is defined as “a person whose gender identity differs
from the sex the person had, or was identified as having, at birth.”). Therefore,
Vincent was born a female but identifies as a male.
247. Cisgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cisgender [https://perma.cc/ B855-U2SQ] (last visited
Oct. 10, 2021) (Cisgender is defined as “a person whose gender identity
corresponds with the sex the person had, or otherwise identified as having, at
birth.”).
248. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 287 So. 3d 150, 153 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2019).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 154.
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years. 251 Vincent filed a petition for custody, and Paula removed his name
from the children’s birth certificates, changed their last names, and
asserted Vincent had no right to custody. 252 Although the court addressed
the concepts of in loco parentis, de facto parent, and psychological parent
status, 253 the court found that the concepts did not apply to the facts of
Ferrand but were helpful in defining the issues. 254 The trial court found
that Vincent failed to meet his burden of proving that substantial harm
would result to the children if sole custody was awarded to Paula. 255
Vincent then appealed, and the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeal noted that because the goal in Louisiana custody cases is to protect
the “best interest of the children,” a custody evaluation was warranted to
determine whether substantial harm would result to the children if the
court awarded Paula sole custody. 256 Additionally, the court noted that the
constitutionally protected rights of legal parents were “not unconditional,”
and each case should be viewed in light of its own facts. 257 The court found
that, traditionally, substantial harm “includes parental unfitness, neglect,
abuse, abandonment of rights, and is broad enough to include ‘any other
circumstances, such as prolonged separation of the child from its natural
parents, that would cause the child to suffer substantial harm.’” 258 On
remand from the Fifth Circuit, the trial court rejected the expert opinion of
Dr. Van Beyer, who testified that awarding sole custody to Paula would
substantially harm the children, and again awarded sole custody to
Paula. 259
After the trial court found that substantial harm to the children would
not result from awarding Paula sole custody, Vincent appealed. 260 The
Fifth Circuit again, on appeal, found that because Vincent was not the
children’s biological or legal parent, article 133 was controlling. 261 In
considering substantial harm, the court found that Vincent had a
substantial relationship with the children since they called him “Daddy”
and lived with him for six and a half out of the eight years of their lives. 262
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id. at 157.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
LOWE, supra note 199, at 1.
Ferrand, 287 So. 3d at 153.
Id.
Id. at 160
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 158.
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Additionally, the court considered Paula’s intention for the children to
know Vincent as their father from birth, her decision to co-parent with
him, and her actions following the dissolution of the relationship. 263 The
court found that, although Vincent lacked legal recognition as the
children’s parent, he clearly fulfilled the role of the primary parent during
the first six years of their lives, but he was deprived of custodial rights to
them for two years because of the court’s difficulty in applying the
substantial harm test. 264 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that awarding
Paula sole custody would result in continued substantial harm because she
psychologically and emotionally abused the children by alienating them
from Vincent. 265
a. Louisiana Courts Back Track on Rights of Non-Filiated Parents
The absence of specific provisions of law protecting non-biological
parents in unmarried, same-sex relationships in Louisiana legislation was
again problematic in the case of Cook v. Sullivan. 266 Billie Cook, a nonbiological parent, and Sharron Sullivan, the biological parent, began a
romantic relationship in 2002 and lived together thereafter. 267 In 2009,
after failed attempts at artificial insemination, Sharon conceived a child
naturally through intercourse with a friend, David Ebard. 268 The couple
did not list Ebarb on the birth certificate, and the child was given the
hyphenated last name “Cook-Sullivan.” 269 Billie and Sharon were not
legally allowed to marry in Louisiana, and because of Louisiana’s
adoption laws, Billie could never formally adopt the child. 270 Billie,
Sharon, and the child lived together until the couple separated in 2013
when the child was four years old. 271
After the two separated, they shared custody of the child, but in July
2016, Sharon unilaterally terminated the visitation agreement. 272 Billie
then filed a petition to establish parentage, custody, and child support in

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 162.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 168.
See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152 (La. 2021).
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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January 2017. 273 The trial court issued a considered decree 274 in which it:
(1) recognized Billie as a legal parent; (2) held that failure to reestablish
the parental relationship between Billie and the child could result in
substantial harm to the child; and (3) awarded Sharon and Billie joint
custody of the child. 275 The trial court found that cases between same-sex
couples who are living together and where one partner conceives through
artificial reproductive technologies or adopts a child are clearly different
than traditional, third-party disputes. 276 Therefore, the court treated Billie
as a legal parent instead of a non-parent and applied a factor test. 277 The
court found that because Billie met the requirements to be identified as a
legal parent, she was not obligated to meet the burden of showing
substantial harm under article 133. 278
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed finding that the trial
court erred in applying its own test rather than article 133. 279 The court
noted that Louisiana law does not currently provide for custody awards to
non-parents based on the doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parent, or
psychological parent status, and, therefore, custody disputes between
former, same-sex partners must be decided under article 133. 280 The Court
of Appeal found that, although the trial court’s determination was
equitable to Billie and in the best interest of the child, “it is not the
273. Id.
274. A considered decree is “an award of permanent custody in which the trial
court receives evidence of parental fitness to exercise care, custody, and control
of children . . . .” Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231, 239 (La. 2016).
275. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 155.
276. Id.
277. Id. The factors the trial court used were:
(1) [t]he parties entered into and engaged in assisted reproduction
measures, voluntarily and jointly planned, which resulted in conception
by one of the parties; (2) [t]he parties resided in the same household
before and for a substantial time after the birth of the child sufficient to
form a parental bond; (3) [t]he non-biological parent engaged in full and
permanent responsibilities and caretaking of the child without
expectations or compensation; (4) [t]he non-biological parent
acknowledged publicly and held [herself] out to be a parent of the child;
(5) [t]he non-biological parent established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child of a parental nature; and (6) [t]he biological
parent supported and fostered the bonded and dependent relationship
between the child and non-biological parent.
Id. (fifth alteration in original).
278. Id. at 156.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 158.
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judiciary’s role to fill in the gaps left by the legislature.” 281 The court found
article 133 controlling in the matter, and, thus, another case turned on the
court’s opinion of the definition of substantial harm. 282 In examining
substantial harm, the court found that the test does not require courts to
determine if the child has suffered emotional distress that could be
considered substantial harm but rather determine if the child will—in the
future—suffer substantial harm by the award of sole custody to the legal
parent. 283 Additionally, because Sharon was a “‘fit parent,’ who loves and
adequately cares for her child . . . [and] the child is thriving and
exceptional” no substantial harm would result from the declining to give
Billie custody rights to the child. 284 Therefore, the court found that the trial
court erred in awarding joint custody and awarded sole custody to
Sharon. 285
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized once again that
the trial court committed legal error. 286 In finding that an award of sole
custody to Sharon would not result in substantial harm to the child, the
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment of sole custody to
Sharon. 287 In concurrence, Justice Griffin noted that the court’s application
of article 133 was problematic in that it assumed a non-biological parent
is less likely to have a parent-child relationship than a biological parent. 288
He went on to say that Billie was not the “third party envisioned by the
legislature” when it enacted article 133 and stressed how it is important
that the legislature address the issues of child custody rights for same-sex
relationships. 289
III. ESTABLISHING PARENTAGE FOR NON-MARTIAL FAMILIES IN OTHER
STATES
Since the 1960s, the idea of the traditional, nuclear family has evolved
to include single parenting, grandparent parenting, step parenting, and

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 156.
Id.
Cook v. Sullivan, 307 So. 3d 1121, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 1130.
Cook, 330 So. 3d at 154.
Id. at 156–57.
Id. at 160 (Griffin, J., concurring).
Id.
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same-sex-couple parenting. 290 In 2019, 1,012,000 households in the
United States were headed by same-sex couples, and approximately half
of those households were unmarried couples. 291 Additionally, in 2019,
almost 200,000 children were living with same-sex parents. 292 The
majority of these families are raising biological children, but same-sex
couples with children are more likely than different-sex couples to adopt
children. 293 Therefore, the composition of the average family 294 has
largely evolved from one with children raised by married, different-sex,
biological parents to include families with same-sex parents, married and
unmarried. 295 Today, a biological parent and a non-biological parent often
raise a child together, and if the relationship between the biological parent
and the non-biological parent ends, the rights of the non-biological parent
to custody or visitation with the child are much different. 296
A. The Uniform Parentage Act
Although Louisiana laws concerning marriage and parenthood remain
unchanged after Obergefell and Pavan, in 2017, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws updated the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA) to address the variability in parentage laws as pertaining to
non-biological parents across the United States. 297 Since then, only four
290. Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1643–44
(1991).
291. Kristina Barrett, U.S. Census Bureau Releases CPS Estimates of SameSex Households, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.census.gov
/newsroom/press-releases/2019/same-sex-households.html [https://perma.cc/WR
G8-NQGN].
292. Id.
293. Danielle Taylor, Same-Sex Couples are More Likely to Adopt or Foster
Children, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.census.gov/lib
rary/stories/2020/09/fifteen-percent-of-same-sex-couples-have-children-in-theirhousehold.html [https://perma.cc/PW2K-WLB9].
294. For large portions of the population, including poor and immigrant
families, the nuclear model never reflected their lived experiences. See generally
Rebecca L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and The Best Interest of the
Child, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615 (2012).
295. Id. at 629.
296. Id.
297. Julie Moreau, Changes to state parenting laws help fill gaps for same-sex
couples, NBC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/changes-state-parenting-laws-help-fill-gaps-same-sex-couples-n
1235517 [https://perma.cc/3MD3-SZMU].
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states have adopted all or large parts of the UPA, but many states have
amended portions of their existing laws to extend protections to children
of same-sex couples. 298 Although these states have taken steps to protect
rights of parents and children in non-marital, same-sex families, some
states, including Louisiana, have laws that are written in a way to exclude
same-sex parents. 299 In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws promulgated the UPA to remove the status of
illegitimacy and provide states with a legal framework for establishing
parent-child relationships. 300 In 2017, the UPA underwent major changes,
including two relevant provisions: (1) the UPA now seeks to ensure the
equal treatment of children born to same-sex couples; and (2) the UPA
includes a provision for the establishment of a de facto parent as a legal
parent of a child. 301 Therefore, the most recent revision to the UPA better
protects the rights of all children, especially those born to same-sex,
unmarried parents and children born through assisted reproductive
technologies. The UPA provides a legal framework to states for
establishing parent-child relationships and is not mandatory, as it is up to
individual states 302 to adopt the Act. 303
There remain gaps in many states’ laws that do not take into account
assisted reproductive technology or unmarried, same-sex couples. 304 In
recent years, however, a few states, inspired by the UPA, made changes to
their laws to address these gaps. 305 For example, unmarried partners Sara
Watson and Anna Ford, citizens of Rhode Island, had a child in 2017. 306
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT (2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e4a82c2a-f7cc-b33e-ed68-47
ba88c36d92&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/G92T-KJS7].
301. Id.
302. Family law is historically a matter of state law. Linda D. Elrod, The
Federalization of Family Law, ABA (July 1, 2009), https://www
.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_
rights_vol36_2009/summer2009/the_federalization_of_family_law/ [https://perma
.cc/778U-7426]. This is because every U.S. state is a sovereign entity and is granted
the power to create laws and regulate them according to their own needs. Id.
303. Melissa Heinig, What is the Legal Definition of a Parent Under the
Uniform Parentage Act?, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.lawyers
.com/legal-info/family-law/paternity/legal-definition-parent-under-uniform-par
entage-act.html [https://perma.cc/V289-6AMF ].
304. See Moreau, supra note 297.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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Despite using Sara’s egg to conceive their son, Sara could not put her name
on his birth certificate because Anna carried and gave birth to the child. 307
At the time Anna gave birth to the couple’s child, Rhode Island did not
recognize Sara as a parent, and the only way for her to acquire parental
rights was to adopt, which requires a mandatory six-month waiting
period. 308 Because Sara could not establish legal parentage immediately,
she could not add the child to her insurance, pick him up from daycare, or
authorize him to go to the doctor. 309 In 2020, however, Rhode Island
adopted the Rhode Island Uniform Parentage Act. 310 This act allows
unmarried, same-sex couples to establish parentage by signing a voluntary
acknowledgement of parentage form. 311 It also updates state law to provide
rights for parents of children born using assisted reproductive
technologies. 312 New Hampshire has a similar law that allows unmarried
couples, whether same-sex or different-sex, to adopt children; extends
second-parent adoption to same-sex parents; and mandates a court’s
parentage judgment to be used to secure parental relationships of children
born through assisted reproduction technology. 313
In Michigan, the Court of Appeals recently held that two unmarried
lesbian partners, one who was a genetic parent and the other who gave
birth to the child, were equal parents to their children. 314 The court found
that under Michigan law, a genetic relationship was not required for a
woman who gestated and birthed her same-sex partner’s genetic
children. 315 She was the child’s natural parent and could seek custody as a
parent, not a third party. 316 One judge, in a separate concurrence, noted
that all parents and their children have a constitutional right to be
recognized regardless of birth or genetics. 317 These examples demonstrate
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. RI ST. § 15-8.1-111 (2022).
311. A voluntary acknowledgement of parentage form (“VAP”) is a document
that establishes a legal relationship between a parent and a child. In most states,
only men who believe they are genetic fathers of their children are allowed to sign
VAPs, but a small number of states now allow parents of any gender or nongenetic parents to sign them. Legal Recognition of LGBT Families, supra note 5.
312. Moreau, supra note 297.
313. An Act Relative to Adoption and Parentage, N.H. HB 1162, 2020 Reg.
Sess. (2020); see also Moreau, supra note 297.
314. Lefever v. Matthews, 971 N.W.2d 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 679.
317. Id.
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other states’ acceptance of same-sex couples and their willingness to
extend the rights of married parents to unmarried parents.
B. Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity and Second Parent
Adoption
Individuals in unmarried, same-sex relationships may also be able to
establish parental rights through voluntary acknowledgement forms. 318 A
voluntary acknowledgment form is a document that establishes the legal
relationship between a parent and a child. 319 As of June 2020, only seven
states have statutes or appellate court decisions allowing parents of any
gender and non-genetic parents to sign voluntary acknowledgments of
parentage (VAPs). 320 VAPs have the same legal effect as a court order, 321
which means that all 50 states must recognize parents who sign VAPs.
Most states only allow men who believe they are genetic fathers of
children to sign VAPs. 322 Although Louisiana has a voluntary
acknowledgement of parentage form, the language on the form indicates
that it is to be used when a biological father who is not the husband of the
mother is to be recognized as the legal father of the child. 323 Thus, it is
unavailable to women and non-biological fathers. 324
Although VAPs are often unavailable to same-sex couples, there is
another avenue to establish parental rights for same-sex couples. Secondparent adoption, or co-parent adoption, allows a same-sex parent,
regardless of whether he or she has a legal relationship with the other
parent, to adopt his or her partner’s child without terminating the first

318. See generally Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage, NTL. CTR. FOR
LESBIAN RTS. (2020), https://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
VAP-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX2G-T9FM].
319. Id.
320. Id. These states are: California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New
York, Vermont, and Washington. See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7572(a)(2) (2022);
MD. CODE. FAM. LAW § 5-1028(c)(1)(vi) (2022); Partanen v. Gallagher, 59
N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 440.285 (2022); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4135-b.1(b)(ii) (McKinney 2022); VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 301
(2022); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.200 (2022).
321. Voluntary Acknowledgement of Parentage, supra note 318.
322. Id.
323. Paternity Information, LA. DEPT. OF HEALTH: STATE REGISTRAR &
VITAL REC., https://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/page/681 [https://perma.cc/L38DCMY3] (last visited May 30, 2022).
324. Id.
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parent’s legal status as a parent. 325 Fifteen states and the District of
Columbia have statutes or appellate court decisions allowing couples to
get second-parent adoption even if they are not married. 326 Louisiana does
not allow for unmarried, second-parent adoption. 327
Although Louisiana does not provide for second-parent adoption,
married same-sex and different-sex couples may use step-parent adoption
as a means of developing a legal relationship with a child.328 Step-parent
adoption occurs when a spouse of a child’s legal parent adopts the child.329
In Louisiana, step-parent adoption is referred to as “intrafamily adoption”
and may take place without the legal status of the relationship between the
initial legal parent and the child changing. 330 This means that when a stepparent adopts through intra-family adoption, the legal relationship
between the child and legal parent is retained rather than severed as with
a typical adoption. 331 There is nothing in Louisiana’s intra-familyadoption statute that prevents a same-sex spouse from completing stepparent adoption of their spouse’s child if the child is not filiated to
someone else. 332 However, because the language in Louisiana Child Code
article 1243 refers only to “stepparent[s], stepgrandparent[s], greatgrandparent[s], grandparent[s], or collaterals within the twelfth degree”

325. Adoption by LGBT Parents, NTL. CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS. (2020), https://
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2PA_state_list.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6G9Z-H7J3].
326. Id. These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Id.
327. LA. CHILD CODE art. 1243 (2022).
328. Id.
329. Louisiana LBGTQ Family Law: A Resource Guide for LGBTQ-Headed
Families Living in Louisiana, FAM. EQUAL. COUNCIL (Dec. 2017), https://
www.familyequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Louisiana-LGBTQ-Fam
ily-Law-Guide-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BU8-M9XG].
330. Id.
331. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1256 (2022).
332. Id. art. 1243; Louisiana LBGTQ Family Law: A Resource Guide for
LGBTQ-Headed Families Living in Louisiana, supra note 329. When the 15th
JDC struck down the Louisiana ban on marriage equality, the court held that an
out-of-state marriage license issued to a same-sex couple was valid in Louisiana.
Additionally, the 15th JDC held that the spouse stratified the stepparent
requirement of LA CHILD. CODE art. 1243. Thus, same-sex, married couples are
entitled to the same access to intra-family adoptions as different-sex couples.
Costanza v. Caldwell, 167 So. 3d 619, 621 (La. 2015).
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individuals in unmarried, same-sex relationships cannot adopt his or her
partner’s child under this provision. 333
C. Psychological Parent, In Loco Parentis, and De Facto Parent Status
A few states have also adopted doctrines to protect the rights of parents
in non-traditional families. The doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto
parent, and psychological parent status each share the characteristic of a
non-parent assuming a caretaking role or responsibility of a typical, natural
parent.334 The phrase “psychological parent” is used to describe the
circumstances under which a third party has stepped into the role of a legal
parent who is unable or unwilling to undertake the obligations of
parenthood or when a party steps into the role of a parent while the legal
parent is still in the picture. 335 A psychological parent may become an
essential focus in a child’s life and may fulfill the child’s physical,
emotional, and psychological needs. 336 Removal of a psychological parent
from a child’s life may result in substantial emotional harm to the child,
such as difficulties with intimacy, coping skills, self-confidence, peer
relations, and aggression. 337
The psychological parent doctrine was first legally recognized by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody H.S.H.-K, and many other
states 338 have since adopted the doctrine to prevent the severance of a nonparent’s relationship with a child at the expense of the child’s wellbeing. 339 In the Louisiana Supreme Court case Cook v. Sullivan, Dr.
333. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1243 (2022).
334. See generally Scharf, supra note 294, at 633.
335. Custody Involving a Non-Parent: The Psychological Parent, CALLAGY L.,
https://callagylaw.com/2016/01/09/custody-involving-a-non-parent-the-psycholog
ical-parent/ [https://perma.cc/98KA-Q9EP] (last visited May 30, 2022).
336. Scharf, supra note 294, at 633.
337. Shelley A. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville: Implications of
Attachment Theory for Judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-Party
Visitation, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 39, 41 (2003).
338. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176–77 (Wash. 2005);
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (finding that a same-sex partner had
standing as the psychological parent to the children born to her former same-sex
partner); Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737 (S.C. 2008) (finding that the nonbiologically related stepfather had standing to seek custody of the child born to
his deceased wife because he had formed a psychological bond with the child).
339. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995); see also
Michelle R. Gros, In the Case of Biology v. Psychology: Where Did my “Parent”
Go?, 52 FAM. L. Q. 147, 157 (2018) [hereinafter Gros, In the Case of Biology v.
Psychology].
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Visconte, a psychologist specializing in marriage and family therapy,
defined a psychological parent as someone a child considers a parent even
though the individual may not be biologically related. 340
In loco parentis describes circumstances in which a non-parent
undertakes “all or some of the caretaking responsibilities of the biological
parent.” 341 In Texas, this doctrine is temporary, 342 and the biological or
legal parent can unilaterally revoke it. 343 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi found that a person who stands in place of a legal parent and
assumes the role and obligation of a parent has in loco parentis status, and
the non-legal parent with in loco parentis status has the same duties,
liabilities, and custodial rights as legal parents against third parties. 344 In
Oklahoma, courts have found that in loco parentis should be expanded to
include same-sex parents; those courts hold any third party who stands in
in loco parentis to a child has legal standing to petition the court for
custody or visitation of the child. 345
Courts also use the doctrine of de facto parent status to describe
circumstances were a non-biological or non-legal parental figure lived
with a child for a certain period of time and was the child’s primary
caregiver or financial supporter. 346 De facto parenting laws provide
340. Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152, 159 n.5 (La. 2021). Dr. Visconte
considered the following factors in determining if an individual should be
considered a psychological parent: (1) whether the biological parent consented to
and fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the
child and non-parent; (2) whether the non-parent and child lived together in the
same household; (3) whether the non-parent assumed obligations of parenthood
by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and
development, including contributing toward the child’s support without
expectation of financial compensation; and (4) whether the non-parent has been
in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child
a bonded, dependent relationship that is parental in nature. Id.
341. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 386.
342. See, e.g., Coons-Anderson v. Anderson, 104 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. App.
2003) (the same-sex partner’s temporary status as a person in loco parentis
expired after the biological mother and her child moved out of the partner’s
home).
343. Gros, In the Case of Biology v. Psychology, supra note 339, at 155.
344. Griffith v. Pell, 881 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 2004).
345. See Newland v. Taylor, 368 P.3d 435 (Okla. 2016) (Six months after the
delivery of a child born to one of the partners of a same-sex couple, their
relationship ended. The court found the non-biological partner had standing to
pursue the best-interest-of-the-child hearing to seek custody or visitation of the
child.).
346. Gros, Since You Brought It Up, supra note 1, at 389.
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individuals, who raise or parent a child but are not a legal parent to the
child, with limited legal rights, such as possible custody or potentially even
full parental rights. 347 Thirty-six states currently recognize the de facto
parent doctrine, with nine of these states recognizing it in a way that may
grant de facto parents visitation, custody, or full parenting rights. 348 Only
9% of the LGBTQ population live in these states. 349 Twenty-seven states
allow for limited recognition of the doctrine, providing a basis for
visitation or custody, with 55% of the LGBTQ population living in these
states. 350 In nine states, recognition of the doctrine is uncertain, and 23%
of the LBGTQ population live in these states. 351
In Ferrand v. Ferrand, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
conducted an analysis of how other southern states 352 treated
psychological parents in custody disputes between a biological parent and
a non-biological parent. 353 Several other southern states have recognized
or applied the doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parent, or
psychological parent status. 354 Kentucky and Oklahoma recognized the
difference between a traditional non-parent—a grandparent or stepparent—and a non-legal parent who the natural parent intended to be a
second parent to the child. 355 In Ramey v. Sutton, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that a biological mother’s former, same-sex partner had
standing to seek custody and visitation under the Uniform Custody

347. Other Parental Recognition Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT
(May 27, 2022), https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/other_parenting_laws
[https://perma.cc/VS27-XDPX] (follow “De Facto Parent Recognition” tab).
348. Id. These states include New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma, Vermont,
Maryland, Connecticut, Delaware, Road Island, and Maine.
349. Id.
350. Id. These states include Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Colorado, Montana, Arizona, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Washington D.C.
351. Id. These states include Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Colorado, Montana, Arizona, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Washington D.C.
352. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
353. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 923 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016).
354. Id.
355. Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 221–22 (Okla. 2015); see also Mullins
v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2010).
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Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 356 There, the non-legal parent had been
involved in the child’s life from conception, parented the child at the
request of the biological mother, and made a conscious decision with the
biological mother to have the child and co-parent as a family. 357 In Mullins
v. Picklesimer, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that a biological
mother waived her paramount right as a natural parent to sole custody of
her child through a joint custody arrangement with her former, same-sex
partner. 358 The court found that the biological mother had encouraged,
fostered, and facilitated the emotional and psychological connection
between her former partner and the child, and the couple jointly decided
to start a family together. 359 After conducting a review of how each state
addressed child custody disputes between biological parents and nonbiological parents, the Fifth Circuit in Ferrand concluded that while a nonbiological third party’s burden of proof differs in each state, all states deem
the best interest of the child as the predominant factor. 360 Additionally,
while many other southern states have adopted in loco parentis,
psychological parent, or de facto parent doctrines, Louisiana has not. 361
Even if doing so may be in the best interest of the child, neither
Louisiana legislation nor jurisprudence currently provides for awarding
custody to a non-legal parent based on his or her status as a psychological
parent. 362 For children born through assisted reproduction, Louisiana
recognizes the non-gestational parent as a legal parent if the couple is
married, but the Louisiana legislature has failed to enact clear and direct
statutes for couples who are not married. 363
Although Louisiana has not yet adopted the doctrines of in loco
parentis, de facto, or psychological parent status, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has recognized the concept of a psychological parent.364 In In re
J.M.P., the Louisiana Supreme Court defined a psychological parent as an
adult who has a psychological relationship with a child from the child’s
356. Ramey, 362 P.3d at 221–22. The Louisiana legislature passed the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in 2006,
and all 50 states have enacted it. The UCCJEA keeps the best interest of the child
as its focus and is intended to provide uniformity and predictability in custody
disputes. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1801 (2022).
357. Ramey, 362 P.3d at 221–22.
358. Mullins, 317 S.W.3d 569, 571.
359. Id. at 580.
360. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 923 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016).
361. Id.
362. See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152 (La. 2021).
363. Other Parental Recognition Laws, supra note 347.
364. In re J.M.P, 528 So. 2d 1002, 1013 (La. 1988).
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perspective. 365 The court went on to say that an adult may become a
psychological parent through day-to-day interaction with the child,
companionship, and shared experiences. 366 Additionally, the role can be
fulfilled by either biological parents or by any caring adult. 367 The court
also noted that courts should prefer a psychological parent over any
claimant who is not a psychological parent, and neither biological ties nor
legal adoption are guarantees that an adult may be a psychological
parent. 368 Lastly, the court noted the importance of the “psychological
parent phenomenon” in determining a child’s best interest but recognized
that in Louisiana, the relationship between a child and a psychological
parent is not given legal recognition. 369
IV. LOUISIANA’S INEQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE RIGHTS OF
UNMARRIED, SAME-SEX PARENTS
As Justice Griffin noted in his dissent in Cook v. Sullivan, Louisiana’s
protections for individuals in same-sex relationships and the children of
these relationships are severely lacking. 370 Same-sex couples, specifically
unmarried couples, face unique challenges in custody disputes. The
absence of the doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parent, and
psychological parent status in Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence
forces courts to decide custody disputes concerning LGBTQ ex-partners
who have co-parented the biological child of one of the partners under
Louisiana Civil Code article 133. 371
The law provides protections for different-sex—both married and
unmarried—couples, same-sex, married couples, and even grandparents.
However, there still remains a gap in Louisiana legislation concerning the
rights of non-parents in unmarried, same-sex relationships. 372 After
Obergefell and Pavan, courts are beginning to recognize the difference
between an uninvolved biological parent seeking custody of a child and a
person acting as a parent but biologically unrelated to the child. 373
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1015.
370. See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152, 160 (La. 2021).
371. See id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
372. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 184–86 (2022); LA. CHILD. CODE art.
1221 (2022); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.
Ct. 2075 (2017).
373. Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644; Pavan 137 S. Ct. at 2077.
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However, these cases provide protections only for married, same-sex
couples, and, thus, individuals in unmarried, same-sex relationships are
left unprotected. While other states are taking steps forward to protect the
rights of same-sex individuals and their children, Louisiana’s legislation
has remained largely unchanged, and courts are forced to deliver
inequitable decisions. 374 Most recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court
illustrated this inadequacy in Cook v. Sullivan. 375
A. Cook v. Sullivan’s Inequitable Holding
Sharon Sullivan and Billie Cook’s relationship pre-dated Obergefell,
and had they married after the case, the presumption of parentage would
have applied retroactively, as evidenced in Boquet. 376 However, the couple
never married and was left without the option of co-parent adoption
because Louisiana adoption laws only allow for married couples jointly or
individuals themselves to petition to adopt. 377 Although Billie functioned
as a parent, without valid adoption, she had no rights to the child. 378
Therefore, Billie was treated as a non-parent and was automatically at a
disadvantage because of the burden of proof under article 133. 379
Both Obergefell and Pavan largely focused on the fundamental rights
of individuals to have families, but these decisions provided rights to
married couples. 380 The United States Supreme Court, however, has
discussed the issue of children born outside of marriages by stating that it
is “constitutionally impermissible” to deny children born outside of
marriage the “critical rights and protections” children born of marriages
receive. 381 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Cook seemingly
does just this.

374. See generally Moreau, supra note 297.
375. See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152 (La. 2021).
376. Id.; see Boquet v. Boquet, 269 So. 3d 895 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2019).
377. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 152; LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1221 (2022).
378. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 152.
379. Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
380. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Pavan v. Smith,
137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
381. Joslin, supra note 132, at 447, 471; see also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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B. Louisiana’s Courts’ Decisions in Unmarried, Same-Sex Custody
Disputes are Inequitable
Due to Louisiana’s unique legal system, legislation is a primary source
of law while jurisprudence is merely persuasive as a secondary source of
law. 382 Therefore, courts are dependent on the laws of the state and are not
necessarily bound by court decisions. 383 However, when there is an
absence of express or implied law, judges are bound to proceed and decide
according to equity. 384 Louisiana has not yet legislatively or
jurisprudentially adopted the doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parent,
or psychological parent status, and the laws of filiation include a
presumption that prevents individuals, who act as parents but lack a
biological connection with a child, from having custodial or parentage
rights. 385 The Louisiana legislature has not yet adopted any specific
provisions regarding individuals who have committed to non-marital,
same-sex relationships in which one of the partners is the biological parent
of the child but both share parental responsibilities. 386 Therefore, because
there is an absence of express or implied law on the rights of parents in
unmarried, same-sex relationships, courts should proceed and decide
custody disputes between a biological and non-biological parent equitably.
However, as evidenced in Cook, this is not always the case. 387
The standard in Tracie F. governs individuals who seek to modify a
stipulated custody judgment, while unmarried, same-sex individuals—
who likely have similar private custody agreements but without a court’s
approval—face a heavier burden of proof. For this type of parent to be
awarded any custody, they must meet the same two-pronged test from
article 133. 388 Parental rights of biological parents are given primacy over
parental rights of non-parents seeking custody of a child, so courts first
use the substantial harm test from article 133 rather than the best interest
of the child test from article 131. 389 This analysis, however, is flawed in
two ways: (1) non-parents who share parental responsibilities with
382. What is Unique About Louisiana Law?, BLOOMLEGAL (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.bloomlegal.com/blog/what-is-unique-about-louisiana-law/ [https://per
ma.cc/8TYD-CADW].
383. Id.
384. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 3d 304, 309 (La. 1978); LA. CIV. CODE
art. 4 (2022).
385. Wallace, supra note 17, at 111.
386. Id.
387. See Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152 (La. 2021).
388. LA. CIV. CODE art. 133 (2022).
389. Id. arts. 131, 133.
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biological parents are deprived of the fundamental right of parentage; and
(2) the best interest of the child is not considered until after the nonbiological parent can meet the first prong. 390
1. Fundamental Rights of Non-Parent Parents
First, the “non-parent” parent who shared parental responsibilities
with the biological parent since the child’s birth or for a majority of his or
her life is deprived of the fundamental rights of parentage. 391 Just as samesex individuals have the fundamental right to marry and have a family,
these individuals also have the fundamental right to not marry. 392 Many
couples, both in different-sex and same-sex relationships, choose to
remain unmarried, and while unmarried, heterosexual couples or
individuals in Louisiana have specific statutory provisions relating to
parentage rights, unmarried, same-sex individuals not filiated to a child do
not. 393 Therefore, Louisiana’s legislation treats unmarried, homosexual
individuals differently than unmarried, heterosexual individuals, and this
undermines “deeply personal considerations,” which the Constitution
protects. 394
In cases where a non-biological parent is a part of the child’s life,
either from the moment the couple decided to conceive the child or for a
majority of the child’s life, the application of substantial harm is
inequitable. Disputes between same-sex couples who raise a child together
as parents are more akin to divorcing parents’ custody disputes than they
are to a parent versus non-parent relationship.395 Although a natural parent
has constitutionally protected rights, those rights must be balanced against
the best interest of the child. Louisiana legislation attempts to balance
these rights by requiring a non-biological parent to prove substantial harm
to the child if the biological parent was given sole custody of the child. 396
This balance weighs heavily against a non-biological parent gaining joint
or sole custody of a child.

390. Joslin, supra note 132, at 467.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 468.
394. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshal, J.,
dissenting); see also Joslin, supra note 132, at 425; Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S. 644 (2015).
395. See generally In re C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017);
see generally Ferrand v. Ferrand, 287 So. 3d 150 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2019).
396. Wallace, supra note 17, at 79.
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If a court finds that a non-biological parent fails to demonstrate
substantial harm, it will, by default, give custody of a child to a biological
parent. 397 Therefore, even though this non-biological parent has the same
emotional and psychological connection to the child but cannot meet the
burden of proving substantial harm, the parent will automatically be
deprived of his or her “fundamental” rights of parentage because of his or
her lack of genetic connection to the child. Additionally, the showing of
substantial harm by a non-biological parent against a biological parent
seems to contradict Louisiana law, which recognizes that biology is not
dispositive of parentage. 398 Louisiana filiation laws presume that the
husband of a mother is the father of the children born or conceived during
the marriage, regardless of biology. 399 Additionally, a husband who
consents to his wife’s use of a sperm donor to conceive a child during their
marriage cannot disavow that child even though the biological child will
not be related to him. 400
2. Does the Best Interest of the Child Really Matter?
Second, the best interest of the child, in cases between non-biological
parents and legal parents, is not considered until after the non-biological
parent satisfies the first prong of the article 133 analysis. 401 This
determination may take months, or even years, as exemplified in Ferrand,
and courts in these cases may not consider the best interest of the child for
years, or ever, if the court finds that no substantial harm exists. 402 In cases
of same-sex partnerships when one parent is not filiated to the child either
biologically or through adoption, the effect on the child when a person
who functions as a parent is removed from the child’s life must be more
deeply considered.
3. What Does Substantial Harm Really Mean?
While non-legal parents have been able to prove substantial harm, the
burden is difficult, and a court’s decision often turns on a court’s
interpretation of “substantial harm.” 403 Few Louisiana courts have applied
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
at 154.
402.
403.

Wallace, supra note 17, at 116.
Id.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 185 (2022).
Id. arts. 187, 189.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 cmt. a (2019); see also Ferrand, 287 So. 3d
See Ferrand, 287 So. 3d 150.
See generally Wallace, supra note 17, at 116.
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current law in a way that protects parental autonomy but expands the
definition of substantial harm when a non-parent parental-figure is seeking
custody. 404 Further, Cook v. Sullivan is the most recent demonstration of
the challenge courts face in applying the substantial harm analysis from
article 133. 405
Louisiana courts’ failure in properly applying the substantial harm
analysis is evidenced in its different interpretations in Ferrand, In re
C.A.C., and Cook. In Ferrand, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit began its
analysis by recognizing a legal parent’s paramount, constitutionally
protected right of “companionship, care, custody, and management” of
their child. 406 The court noted, however, that this right is not
unconditional; courts should view each custody dispute in light of its own
facts in addition to the “overarching and overriding” principle of the best
interest of the child. 407 The Ferrand court found that, traditionally,
substantial harm “includes parental unfitness, neglect, abuse,
abandonment of rights, and is broad enough to include ‘any other
circumstances, such as prolonged separation of the child from its natural
parents . . . .’” 408 This definition of substantial harm, however, differs from
the definitions the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the
Louisiana Supreme Court used.
In In re C.A.C., the Fourth Circuit found that the substantial harm
article 133 intended is the “threat of abuse or neglect of the child by an
unfit parent . . . .” 409 The court went on to say that in same-sex
relationships, third parties may be more like co-parents than grandparents
or other extended family members. 410 Therefore, separation from the nonlegal parent who, from the child’s perspective, was the child’s parent
would cause substantial harm. 411
In Cook v. Sullivan, the Louisiana Supreme Court used the language
“substantial harm” and “detrimental” interchangeably, which seemingly
404. Id.
405. Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152, 156 (La. 2021); LA. CIV. CODE art. 133
(2022).
406. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 919 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016)
(citing Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 188 So. 3d 231, 234 (La. 2016); In re Adoption
of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990)).
407. Id. (citing Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 174 So. 3d 781, 796 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2015)).
408. Id. (quoting Ramirez v. Ramirez, 124 So. 3d 8, 17 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2013)).
409. In re C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58, 68 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
410. Id. at 69.
411. Id. at 70.
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reverts article 133 to its pre-1993 revision language. 412 Additionally, the
court found that because the child was “bright, happy, creative, energetic
. . . and well-rounded,” awarding Sharon sole custody would not cause
substantial harm. 413 Therefore, the court rested its decision that substantial
harm would not result to the child from an award of sole custody to Sharon
on its flawed assumption that because the child possesses positive
personality traits, she will not suffer any emotional harm by removing a
parental figure from her life.
4. Can Courts Consider Substantial Harm Without Considering the
Best Interest of the Child?
Although article 133 requires a two-pronged test, courts should
determine if one prong can be considered without considering the other. 414
In Ferrand, the Fifth Circuit noted the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
emphasis in Tracie D. v. Francisco D. that the best interest of the child is
the principal consideration in all custody determinations, including
contests between parents and non-parents. 415 The court questioned,
however, if a court can decide whether a non-parent has met the burden of
proving substantial harm without considering the best interest of the
child. 416
Evidenced in Ferrand, when a court does not consider the best interest
of the child and focuses only on substantial harm, the court may enable
future substantial harm to exist. 417 As Justices Kennedy and Stevens noted
in their dissents in Troxel, although legal parents have constitutionally
protected rights to the custody, care, and control of their children, the best
interest standard should not be minimalized. 418 The best interest standard
is especially important as the structure of family units evolves to include
third parties who are really parents from the child’s perspective. 419 Both
parents, whether legal or non-legal, who consent to have a child and raise
that child in a family unit with two parents sharing responsibilities and
obligations, should be able to enjoy custody of the child if it is in the
child’s best interest.
412. Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152, 157 (La. 2021); see Wallace, supra
note 17, at 80.
413. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 160.
414. Wallace, supra note 17, at 80 n.560.
415. Id.; Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016).
416. Wallace, supra note 17, at 80 n.560; Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909.
417. See generally Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909.
418. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 100 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
419. Id.
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C. It’s Time for the Louisiana Legislature to Protect Children of SameSex Couples.
The need for the doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parent, and
psychological parent status has increased as the nature of traditional family
units has changed. Incorporation of any one of these principles would
provide more protection for partners in unmarried, same-sex relationships
who parent children together. Ideally, the Louisiana legislature should
update all of the Civil Code articles relating to parentage and filiation to
adopt these principles. 420 The legislature should adopt an article including
language similar to the following: “When awarding custody, in disputes
between a legal parent and an individual who has acted as a parent to his
or her partner’s child, the court shall consider the psychological
relationship the child has to the third-party and the effect on the child of
severing that relationship.”
However, it is unlikely that the legislature will expressly adopt these
doctrines. This is because of the Louisiana legislature’s refusal to
acknowledge the evolution of family units from its traditional meaning, as
well as its history of failing to redraft Civil Code articles to be in line with
United States Supreme Court decisions. 421 Additionally, adoption of these
doctrines would likely not change the law much because the legal parent
would still have priority over the non-legal parent under Troxel. 422 This is
because a legal parent has a recognized right to parent his or her own child
while a non-legal parent does not. 423 One scholar proposed a revision to
the filiation articles to include the gender-neutral language of “spouse”
instead of “husband,” 424 but this proposed revision would extend the
presumption of parentage only to married couples, and, thus, individuals
in unmarried, same-sex relationships would once again be left without
protection. Therefore, to better protect the rights of non-legal parents in
unmarried, same-sex relationships and their children, the Louisiana
legislature should amend article 133 to include a factor test similar to the
one set out by the 26th Judicial District Court in Cook v. Sullivan.
420. Tracy, supra note 40, at 1561.
421. Louisiana still criminalizes sodomy despite the Supreme Court’s almost
20-year-old decision in Lawrence v. Texas. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:89 (2022);
see also Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Additionally, the Louisiana
legislature did not update the state’s abortion statutes despite the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade until 1991, almost 20 years later. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). See also LA. REV. STAT. § 14:89 (2022); Tracy, supra note 40, at 1536.
422. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100.
423. See generally id.
424. See generally Tracy, supra note 40, at 1529–30.

2022]

COMMENT

369

1. Cook v. Sullivan Factors
The 26th Judicial District Court in Cook used the following factors to
determine if Billie should be deemed a legal parent: (1) whether the parties
entered into and engaged in assisted reproduction measures voluntarily
and jointly, which resulted in conception by one of the parties; (2) whether
the parties resided in the same household before and for a substantial time
after the birth of the child sufficient to form a parental bond; (3) whether
the non-legal parent engaged in full and permanent responsibilities and
caretaking of the child without expectations or compensation; (4) whether
the non-legal parent acknowledged the child publicly and held [herself]
out to be a parent of the child; (5) whether the non-legal parent established
a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that was of a parental
nature; and (6) whether the legal parent supported and fostered the bonded
and dependent relationship between the child and the non-legal parent. 425
The Louisiana Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal used similar
factors in both In re C.A.C. and Ferrand. 426 Therefore, these factors are
not new and have led to similar holdings in both cases. By adopting similar
factors, the legislature would give the Louisiana courts guidance as to what
to do in custody disputes between non-legal parents and legal parents,
which will better protect the best interests of children and the fundamental
rights of both legal and non-legal parents. These factors would give courts
a way to better protect children without requiring the legislature to
expressly acknowledge the evolution of a family from the traditional
husband and wife to same-sex partners, both married and unmarried, as it
has been so unwilling to do.
Louisiana courts do not overturn a trial court’s custody determination
unless the trial court applied the wrong law or abused its discretion. 427 This
procedure is intended to promote stability and consistency in the child’s
life. 428 Implementing these factors at the trial court level in custody
disputes between a legal parent and a non-legal parent, who has parented
the child since birth or from very early in his or her life, would promote
consistency in the courts’ analyses. To promote the best interests of
children in custody determinations, courts should prevent trial courts from
going back and forth on who is awarded custody in disputes between
unmarried, same-sex couples. The factors set forth by the Cook trial court
425. Cook v. Sullivan, 330 So. 3d 152, 155 (La. 2021).
426. See In re C.A.C., 231 So. 3d 58, 68 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017); Ferrand
v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016).
427. See Thompson v. Thompson, 532 So. 2d 101 (La. 1988).
428. See generally id.
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would enable courts to provide continuity and stability to children’s lives,
which is always in a child’s best interest.
Some may argue that this proposed solution would lead to a large shift
in courts awarding non-legal parents custody over legal parents, thus
violating the legal parents’ fundamental rights as parents. However, the
26th Judicial District Court’s first and sixth factors consider a legal
parent’s custody, care, and control of his or her child. 429 The factors do so
by considering acts of the legal parent in fostering a relationship between
the non-legal parent and child and the legal parent’s decision to bring a
child into the world with their ex-partner. The trial court’s factors also
consider the best interest of the child, with factors (2), (3), (6) being
substantially similar to Louisiana Civil Code article 134’s best interest of
the child factors (5), (12), and (14). 430 Additionally, the factors the 26th
Judicial District enumerated are similar to the ones Dr. Visconte used in
Cook in considering whether an individual should be considered a
psychological parent. 431 If a non-legal parent would be considered a
psychological parent, the effect of removing him or her from a child’s life
would be substantial, and, therefore, the proposed factors would allow
courts to weigh both the best interest of the child and potential substantial
harm simultaneously while also considering a parent’s fundamental right
of parentage.
2. Tracie F. v. Francisco D.’s Standard is Also an Equitable Solution
Alternatively, the Louisiana legislature can revise Civil Code article
133 to mandate that a legal parent who has a stipulated judgment or has
consented to a custody arrangement with a non-legal parent must meet the
standard set forth in Tracie D. v. Francisco F. to modify the custody
arrangement. 432 In both Ferrand and Cook, the non-legal parents seeking
custody had arrangements with the legal parent, which allowed them at
least visitation.433 It is likely that most of the individuals seeking custody
rights to the children they have parented have some sort of custody
arrangement with a legal parent before the legal parent unilaterally severs
the agreement when the couple breaks up. In Tracie D. v. Francisco F.,
429. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 159 n.5; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 134 (2022).
430. Id.
431. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 159 n.5. The trial court in Cook v. Sullivan used Dr.
Visconte’s, an expert witness who testified as to the psychological effects of
removing a non-legal parent from a child’s life, factors in crafting its factor test.
432. Tracie F. v. Francisco D. 188 So. 3d 231, 235 (La. 2016).
433. See Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2016);
Cook, 330 So. 3d 152.
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when a grandparent-non-parent had a stipulated judgement of joint
custody with a legal parent, the legal parent had the burden of proving that
(1) there was a material change in circumstances after the original custody
award; and (2) the proposed modification is in the best interest of the
child. 434 This standard has already been applied to consent judgments
between unmarried, same-sex individuals, as exemplified in In re J.E.T. 435
Billie Cook and Sharron Sullivan had an agreement, although not declared
by the court, in which they shared custody of their child. 436 The court’s
failure in Cook to consider the custody agreement between Billie and
Sharron was inequitable and more in line with In re Melancon, which In
re J.E.T. overruled. 437
While a legal parent has constitutionally protected rights, if he or she
consents to a custody arrangement with an ex-partner, this evidences the
intent to share his or her fundamental right of parentage with the expartner. The standard promotes the stability of children’s living and
familial arrangements without depriving a legal parent of the opportunity
to obtain custody. Therefore, the application of the standard set forth in
Tracie F. v. Francisco D. and echoed in In re J.E.T. weighs both a parent’s
fundamental right and the best interest of the child. This is a more
equitable solution than the substantial harm analysis of article 133.
Although these individuals should already be considered legal parents, this
standard would put non-legal parents in unmarried, same-sex relationships
on the same level as traditional-non-parents, such as grandparents—who
have means of establishing visitation or a legal relationship with a child
through intra-family adoption. This standard would be a step up from their
current treatment as strangers to the child. Additionally, because courts
have already used this standard in cases not involving same-sex couples, 438
the revised article would also apply to disputes involving third-party
parents like grandparents or other family members. This would allow the
legislature to adopt an article that not only protects children of unmarried,
same-sex couples but also children who are parented by third parties
without having to acknowledge the growing nature of children raised by
same-sex parents.

434. Tracie F., 188 So. 3d at 235.
435. In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016).
436. Cook, 330 So. 3d at 152.
437. Id.; see In re Melancon, 62 So. 3d 759 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010); In re
J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575.
438. See generally In re J.E.T., 211 So. 3d 575; Tracie F., 188 So. 3d 231.
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CONCLUSION
The goal of custody disputes should be “frequent and continuing
contact with both parents.” 439 Depriving children of unmarried, same-sex
couples of this right because one parent cannot establish filiation through
adoption or voluntary acknowledgments treats these children differently
than children of married, same-sex or married and unmarried, differentsex couples. This disparity takes away the opportunity for a child to have
two parents who are willing and able to parent. Louisiana’s parentage laws
punish individuals and their children in same-sex couples for remaining
unmarried by depriving the non-legal parents of the same rights
individuals in married, different-sex relationships and same-sex
relationships enjoy.
Revision to Louisiana’s Civil Code articles relating to filiation and
parentage is greatly needed, and a good starting point would be to revise
courts’ considerations in determining substantial harm under article 133.
If the Louisiana legislature adopts the proposed factors above, this would
consider the rights of individuals who are not filiated to children but have
acted as a parent for the majority of the child’s life. Additionally, this
would consider a filiated parent’s fundamental rights and also the best
interest of the child, which should always be the overarching concern in
custody disputes. Alternatively, revising article 133 with the standard the
Louisiana Supreme Court set forth in Tracie F. v. Francisco D. would give
courts a more equitable solution in custody disputes between non-legal
parents and legal parents. To apply one standard in custody disputes
between grandparents and other non-parents who have stipulated
judgments with legal parents and to apply another, more heightened
standard in disputes between unmarried, same-sex couples who have
deliberately chosen together to bring a child into the world and co-parent
is inequitable. Although the Louisiana legislature does not want to address
the growing number of families involving same-sex couples, it should at
least recognize the harm children of these families may suffer because of
the gap in the law concerning the rights of their unmarried, same-sex
parents.

439. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:335(A)(2)(a) (2022) (emphasis added).

